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Abstract Coleman’s equilibrium model of social development, the Linear System
of Action, is extended to cover the dynamics of societal transitions. The model im-
plemented has the characteristics of a dissipative system. A variation and selection
algorithm favoring the retention of relatively dependent actors forces the system away
from equilibrium, while exchange of control, according to Coleman the driving force
behind social action, accounts for dissipation, pulling the social system back to equi-
librium. This Non-linear System of Action self-organizes into a critical state, as con-
firmed by the robust power law distribution of exchange of control for a wide range
of model sizes. Related punctuated equilibrium dynamics and structural change are
of special interest, as these are closely connected to hypotheses on social dynamics
developed in the literature on societal transitions.
Keywords Punctuated equilibrium · Self-organized criticality · Societal transition ·
Social change · Coleman · Social simulation
1 Introduction
Transitions are structural innovations of societal systems in reaction to wicked
problems threatening development (Rotmans 2005; Rotmans et al. 2001; Van der
Brugge et al. 2005; Geels and Kemp 2000). Transition studies offer an analyti-
cal framework for describing and explaining the dynamic behavior of societal sys-
tems, such as transport, energy supply, agriculture, and water management. The un-
derlying transition dynamics are complex interaction processes between markets,
J. Timmermans ()
Faculty of Social Sciences, Dutch Research Institute for Transitions, Erasmus University Rotterdam,
P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands
e-mail: timmermans@fsw.eur.nl
url: http://www.eur.nl/fsw/staff/homepages/timmermans/
Punctuated equilibrium in a non-linear system of action 351
networks, institutions, technologies, policies, individual behavior and autonomous
trends in the economic, ecological, socio-cultural and institutional domain. From
a complex adaptive systems perspective, transitions are system transformations be-
tween two temporal dynamic equilibrium states. In between there is a period of
rapid change during which the system undergoes irreversible re-organization (Rot-
mans 2005). According to Rotmans (2005) and Rotmans et al. (2001) the gen-
eral pattern of evolution of a societal transition can be divided in four phases, pre-
development, take-off, acceleration and stabilization. In the pre-development phase,
the system dynamics do not change visibly. In the take-off the structure of the
system begins to change, while in the acceleration phase structural transformation
takes place. In the stabilization phase the system reaches a new dynamic equilib-
rium.
The conceptualization of societal transitions in transition studies has much in com-
mon with a class of revolutionary change theories based on the punctuated equi-
librium paradigm postulated by Eldredge and Gould (Gould and Eldredge 1977;
Eldredge and Gould 1972). The punctuated equilibrium paradigm is used in differ-
ent strands of the social sciences; with reference to Eldredge and Gould and explicit
use of the concept of punctuated equilibrium, Castells (1996) analyses the rise of the
network society at the end of the twentieth century as ‘. . . one of these rare inter-
vals in history. . . ’, similarly, Baumgartner and Jones (Jones and Baumgartner 2005;
Baumgarter and Jones 1993) apply the concept of punctuated equilibrium to explain
the alternation of long periods of stability and rapid change in American policy do-
mains. Transition studies can be positioned in between the work of Castells, who
analyses structural change in social systems and Baumgartner and Jones who remain
at the level of the policy system. Transition studies aim to explain stability and struc-
tural change in functional sub-systems supplying an important function to a society,
like energy supply, water resources management or mobility and transport (Rotmans
2005; Rotmans et al. 2001; Van der Brugge et al. 2005).
Gersick (1991) confronts the Darwinian concept of incremental cumulative
change with the punctuated equilibrium paradigm through exploring six empirically
derived theories from psychology, group dynamics, organization science, biology
and self-organizing systems. Gersick compares these six theories using five relevant
concepts from the punctuated equilibrium paradigm; general description of the punc-
tuated equilibrium model, how punctuated equilibrium models differ from traditional
counterparts, the concept of deep structure, the concept of equilibrium periods and the
concept of revolutionary change. In Table 1 the analyses of Gersick is complemented
and transition studies is positioned in the field of theories working from the punctu-
ated equilibrium paradigm. Parallels are especially strong in the conceptualization of
a deep structure, the alternation of stability and change and the description of rev-
olutionary periods. Deep structure is of specific interest because both Gersick and
transition studies relate periods of revolutionary change to changes in deep structure.
In transition studies deep structure is described in terms of the dominant practices,
culture and structure of the regime, the dominant way in which a societal need is
fulfilled (Rotmans 2005).
Bak and Sneppen (1993) were the first to develop theoretical support for the
punctuated equilibrium hypotheses of Eldredge and Gould in their simple model
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Table 1 Transition studies and the punctuated equilibrium paradigm (after Gersick 1991)
Commonalities in the description of the punctuated equilibrium paradigm
Six theories: Systems evolve through the alteration of periods of equilibrium, in which persistent under-
lying structures permit only incremental change, and periods of revolution, in which these underlying
structures are fundamentally alter.
Transition Studies: transitions develop according to four phases, pre-development, take-off, acceleration
and stabilization. In the pre-development phase, the system dynamics do not change visibly. In the take-
off the structure of the system begins to change, while in the acceleration phase structural transformation
takes place. In the stabilization phase the system reaches a new dynamic equilibrium (Van der Brugge and
Rotmans 2007; Martens and Rotmans 2005). . . . we see a transformation from slow to quick development
and instability, reverting at last to relative stability (Rotmans et al. 2001).
Commonalities in the description of the differences between punctuated equilibrium and traditional mod-
els
Six theories: Systems do not evolve through a gradual blending from one state to the next. Systems’ histo-
ries are unique. They do not necessarily evolve from lower to higher states, through universal hierarchies
or stages, or toward pre-set ends.
Transition studies: A transition is no fixed pattern, nor a blue print, it is not uniform and deterministic
there are large differences in the rate and scale of change. Rather transitions are possible development
paths (Rotmans 2005).
Communalities in the concept of Deep Structure
Six theories: Deep structure is a network of fundamental ‘choices’, of the basic configuration in to which
a system’s units are organized, and the activities that maintain both this configuration and the system’s
resource exchange with the environment. Deep structure in human systems is largely implicit. Transition
Studies: . . . where the structural character of society transforms (Martens and Rotmans 2005). . . . in which
society changes in a fundamental way (Rotmans et al. 2001). Its internal dynamics are deeply embedded
in social interactions that are consequently difficult to change. . . . The system undergoes irreversible re-
organization. . . (Van der Brugge et al. 2005). . . . new structures emerge and existing structures are broken
down (Van der Brugge and Rotmans 2007). . . . there are patterns of institutions, artefacts, rules and norms
assembled and maintained to perform economic and social activities which is referred to as the regime
(Smith et al. 2005). . . . transitions are system transformations. . . (Van der Brugge and Rotmans 2007)
Communalities in the concepts of equilibrium periods
Six theories: During equilibrium periods, systems maintain and carry out the choices of their deep struc-
ture. Systems make adjustments that preserve the deep structure against internal and external perturba-
tions, and move incrementally along paths built into the deep structure. Pursuit of stable deep structure
may result in behavior that is turbulent on the surface.
Transition Studies: . . . the regime grows ‘critical’ and innovations start acting as perturbations of the status
quo (Van der Brugge and Rotmans 2007). . . . transitions are system transformations between to temporal
(dynamic) equilibrium states (Van der Brugge and Rotmans 2007). . . . the regime is able to maintain
and reproduce its internal dynamics (Van der Brugge and Rotmans 2007). . . . the new regime settles
down. Transformation processes turn into optimization processes. Regime dynamics now are equilibrium
dynamics (Van der Brugge and Rotmans 2007).
Communalities in the concepts of revolutionary periods
Six theories: Revolutions are relatively brief periods when a system’s deep structure comes apart, leaving
it in disarray until the period ends, with the ‘choices’ around which a new deep structure forms. Rev-
olutionary outcomes, based on interactions of systems’ historical resources with current events, are not
predictable; they may or may not leave a system better off. Revolutions vary in magnitude.
Transition Studies: . . . visible structural changes take place through an accumulation of socio-cultural,
ecological and institutional changes. . . (Rotmans et al. 2001). . . . in between there is a period of rapid
change. . . (Van der Brugge and Rotmans 2007). . . . we see a transformation from slow dynamics to quick
development and instability. . . (Rotmans et al. 2001). . . . in which the speed of social change decreases
and a new dynamic balance is reached (Martens and Rotmans 2005).
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of evolution. Bak and Sneppen relate punctuated equilibrium dynamics to Self Or-
ganized Criticality (SOC), as introduced by Bak et al. (1988). They define this
self-organized critical state as a global attractor for the system as it is not depen-
dent on the initial conditions and hence is self-organized.1 Where Gersick infers
that punctuated equilibrium dynamics are related to a deep structure stabilizing
the system in periods of equilibrium and re-structuring in periods of revolution-
ary change, Bak and Sneppen relate punctuated equilibrium to SOC, signified by
power law distributions of the outputs of these systems (Bak et al. 1988; Bak and
Sneppen 1993). SOC and power law distributions have since been related to many
natural phenomenon like earthquakes, sand and rice pile dynamics, super conduc-
tion and droplet formation (Field et al. 1995; Plourde et al. 1993; Held et al. 1990;
Jaeger et al. 1989) while punctuated equilibrium and deep structure approaches
mainly continued in the social and management sciences (Gersick 1991).
Because of these diverging traditions the relation between SOC and deep structure
in relation to punctuated equilibrium remained unspecified. Except from some recent
contributions in social network analyses, where SOC and power laws are found to
characterize empirical and simulated social networks (Whitmeyer and Yeingst 2006;
Albert and Barabási 2002; Watts 2002). For transition studies, both the quantitative
interpretation of punctuated equilibrium dynamics in term of the (power law) distrib-
ution of the speed and size of change as used by Bak and Sneppen and the qualitative
interpretations in term of deep structure as introduced by Gersick are of interest.
The computational approach to societal transitions developed in this article, starts
from the punctuated equilibrium paradigm and focuses on both the dynamics of such
a model and the identification of structural change. The Social Theory of James S.
Coleman (1990) is used as a starting point. This theory is a well established social the-
ory, addresses social development of which societal transitions are a specific instance
and is widely applied in sociology and policy analysis (Timmermans and Beroggi
2004; Timmermans 2004; Schouten et al. 2001; Stokman and Berveling 1998; Stok-
man and Zeggelink 1996; Pappi and Knoke 1991) and has a quantitative implemen-
tation, the Linear System of Action (LSA), that seems promising for our purpose.
In the remainder of this paper first a model of social dynamics showing punctuated
equilibrium dynamics and self-organized criticality is developed and some structural
characteristics of this model, related to the regime concept of transition studies, are
investigated. Finally promising directions for further theoretical research and practi-
cal applications of the model in further developing the field of transition management
are identified.
2 The linear system of action
Coleman’s Social Theory explains social development as the result of exchange of
control over issues between actors and belongs to the group of social theories that
1In a later paper by Tamarit et al. (1998) the Bak Sneppen model, like the onset of chaos in one dimensional
maps, is proven to show weak dependence on initial conditions. This property in connected to the fractal
nature of the self-organised attractor and is believed to be crucial for the evolutionary process.
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apply exchange theorizing and rational choice theory (Turner 1998). According to
Coleman, any social system exists of actors and issues over which they exercise con-
trol and in which they have some interest (Coleman 1990). It is each actor’s interest
in issues under another’s control that lead purposive actors (Weber 1958 [1904]) to
engage in interactions involving exchanges of control. In these transactions actors
maximize their control over issues of their interests. According to Coleman these
profitable exchanges of control are the primary explanatory factor for social develop-
ment. To illustrate the argumentative structure embedded in Coleman’s Social Theory
we next present an example from decision making, where decision makers are char-
acterized by their interest in and control over an issue and the decision is framed in
terms of exchange of control.
In decision making on the construction of a power plant, the particular electricity
company that wants to invest might depend on the banks to finance the plant while
at the same time it needs a license from the water authority for cooling water, the
provincial government for spatial planning, the local government for environmen-
tal and building licenses and the national government and local fire department for
safety requirements. Furthermore, the location of the plant in the national electric-
ity network managed by a national authority is relevant, two or three local and re-
gional environmental groups have concerns, a national action group against nuclear
energy fears the nuclear option while a local organization of farmers is planning to
invest in the production of wind energy. In this complicated situation the issues at
stake reach from environmental and ecological concerns, safety, profitability, finan-
cial and technical feasibility, reliability of the electricity supply, spatial planning and
maybe more. At the same time these issues are under (shared) control of numerous
actors. For examples, the farmer’s organization might be willing to sell the land for
the power plant if they are granted licenses for the construction of wind turbines and
receive the right to connect to the electricity network and a good price for the elec-
tricity produced. At the same time the water authority opts for air-cooling instead of
water-cooling with reference to ecological concerns, down stream water users and
climate change, while spatial planning and local environmental groups are of the
opinion that the industrial image of cooling towers does not fit the mainly rural set-
ting.
According to Coleman such a complex decision making process can be de-
scribed in term of exchange of control. The actors involved need to interact and
negotiate to establish the distributions of control and interest and consequently the
value of control over the issues at stake to come to a decision (Coleman 1990;
Timmermans 2004). At the same time an alternative design for the power plant needs
to be developed that incorporates the issues at stake in such a way that the exchange
of control can be operationalized through the implementation of this alternative (Tim-
mermans 2004).
The Linear System of Action (LSA) is the formal implementation of this theory
and is based on micro-economic theory and its use of utility theory (Coleman 1990),
but deviates from micro-economic theory in its prescription of a specific form of the
utility function. Micro-economic theory takes a more general approach and proves
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Table 2 Matrices of control C and interest X specifying the LSA
C X
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
C11 C1j C1(j+1) . . . . . . C1n
Ci1 Cij C1(j+1) . . . . . . Cin
C(i+1)1 . . . C(i+1)(j+1) . . . . . . C(i+1)n
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cm1 Cmj Cm(j+1) . . . . . . Cmn
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
X11 X1i X1(i+1) . . . . . . X1m
Xj1 Xji C1(j+1) . . . . . . Xjm
X(j+1)1 . . . X(j+1)(i+1) . . . . . . X(j+1)m
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Xn1 Xni Xn(i+1) . . . . . . Xmn
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
that under conditions of positive and declining marginal utility equilibrium exists.2
In addition, Coleman fixes the general shape of the utility function in the LSA which
makes it possible to calculate the competitive equilibrium. The LSA uses a multi-
plicative utility function:
Ui = cx1ii1 · cx2ii2 . . . · cxmiim , (1)
where Ui is the total utility of actor i, cij is the amount of control over issue j held by
actor i and where xji , the interest of actor i in issue j , expresses the contribution that
this control makes towards the utility of actor i.3 The variables of the utility function
correspond directly to the basic concepts of the LSA: control over issues, cij , and
interest in issues, xji . Furthermore in the LSA control and interest are relative notions
and scaled arbitrarily to 1. In matrix notation a LSA for a social system of n actors
and m issues is fully specified by the matrices X and C, the distributions of control
and interest over the actors and the issues (Table 2).
For a large number of actors and a large number of issues the conditions for a
fully competitive market are realized and exchanges of control converge on a unique
competitive equilibrium in which each issue has a single price, the rate at which it
is traded in all transactions. At equilibrium all actors have maximized their control
over the issues that most interest them subject to their initial control and no further
exchanges of control occur. A method to calculate the competitive equilibrium for
such a linear system is presented in the Appendix.
3 A non-linear system of action
The LSA presented above is an equilibrium model. In the LSA there are no changes
in the equilibrium values of issues neither of the distribution of control over actors;
the matrices C and X are fixed. Societal transitions however exactly involve such
2Micro economic theory does not specify the shape of the utility function. Given the conditions on the
first and second derivative of the utility function, positive contribution to utility and declining marginal
utility, micro-economic theory proves the general existence of equilibrium, as described in a famous paper
by John Nash (1950).
3This multiplicative form is also known as a Cobb-Douglas production function and relates production to
the input of capital and labour. The utility function used by Coleman in the LSA has the same shape as
the Cobb-Douglas production function and control in the LSA is similar to capital while interest reflects
labour.
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shifts from one dynamic equilibrium to another. According to Coleman three sources
of a shift in equilibrium exist (Coleman 1990). First, issues can enter or leave the
system, second, new actors can enter the system, and third actors and issues can
enter or leave the social system simultaneously (Coleman 1990: pp. 895–896). All
three developments result in a shift in the distribution of interest and control of the
LSA and consequently a new equilibrium. Coleman does elaborate on the reasons
for actors or issues to enter or leave the system for the specific case of single- and
double-contingency panics (Coleman 1990: pp. 899–931) but does not present a more
general explanation.
To describe the social dynamics involved in transitions a more general explanatory
theory of equilibrium shifts in the LSA is required. In the following we propose a
variation and selection procedure of actors, based on a rational approach at both the
actor and the system level. For individual actors in the social system it is rational to
select actors into the social system that increase their own opportunities for exchange
of control and thus realizations of their individual interests. At the system level this
rational behavior of individual actors leads to a collective outcome in which actors
adding most to the opportunities for profitable exchanges of control for the entire
system are retained.
Whether we define this mechanism as a pure selection mechanism operating on
existing actors outside the social system studied, as proposed by Coleman (1990) or
as a mutation procedure which forces less fit actors to mutate in order to continue
to be a member of the specific social system is not relevant for the dynamics of the
model proposed. We favor the mutation explanation because it links to the idea that
an important difference between the social dynamics in equilibrium conditions and
in transitions is the shift in equilibrium of the LSA caused by changing interests or
control of actors under transition conditions. This change in interest or control of
an actor can be interpreted as a contribution to the change in the deep structure of
the social system (Gersick 1991) or a mechanism to self-organize into a critical state
(Bak et al. 1988) and can be explained in terms of the three phases, frame breaking
(unfreezing), frame moving and frame re-alignment (re-freezing) of Lewin’s process
for changing social values (Lewin 1951). This model is also extensively applied in
change management and leadership theories (Worren et al. 1999; Fiol et al. 1999).
The interpretation of mutations through the change of individual values is further
bolstered by the observation of two prominent authors on rational choice theories,
Michael Hechter (1987, 1988) and again James S. Coleman in their theories of group
solidarity. These theories explain the emergence of groups from the rational self-
interested behavior of individual actors. Coleman’s line of thinking develops around
the need for actors to interact in order to produce joined goods contributing to the re-
alization of the interests of the individual actor (Coleman 1986). Changes in the dis-
tribution of the control of an individual actor can similarly be attributed to changes in
the perception of the remaining actors in the system on the control of the mutated ac-
tor, as the concept of control is radically subjective (Sebenius 1992). Next we develop
the computational implementation of the variation and selection procedure proposed.
Selecting the actor offering the least possibilities for profitable exchanges of con-
trol needs an evaluation at the system level. The dependence of an actor is a quan-
titative measure of the contribution of the respective actors to the total potential for
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profitable exchanges of control in that LSA. When the matrices C and X of the LSA
are known the matrix of inter-actor dependencies, Dact, can be calculated as:
Dact = C × X. (2)
Dact is a square matrix of size m × m and its entries dij give the dependence of the
column actor, i, on the row actor, j . Dependence is calculated as the sum of the con-
trol of the ‘independent’ row actor in C times the interest of the ‘dependent’ column
actor in X. The main diagonal of matrix Dact gives the self-dependency of actors
(Timmermans 2004). Self-dependency of actors indicates to which extend actors are
independent of the other actors in realizing their interests. It follows logically that
the most self-dependent actor is also the most independent actor in the social system
and consequently offers the minimum contribution in terms of potential exchange of
control. This actor is selected for mutation.
In terms of the LSA mutating an actor means that the interest and control of the
actor are changed. For an individual actor mutation is a purposive action, involving
unfreezing and re-freezing (Lewin 1951), with the aim to save his/her membership of
the social system and thus his/her opportunities to produce joined goods contributing
to his/her individual interests (Coleman 1986). To satisfy the requirements of the
social system as a whole the mutation of the actor should take place at the issue
that contributes least to the potential for exchanges of control. In analogy with the
selection of the mutating actor, the issue at which the actors’ distribution of interest
and control are changed can be selected by determining the least dependent issue of
the LSA. When the matrices C and X of the LSA are known the matrix of inter-issue
dependencies, Diss, can be calculated as:
Diss = X × C. (3)
Diss is a square matrix of size n × n and the entries dij in the matrix give the de-
pendence of the row issue i, on the column issue, j . Dependence is calculated as
the sum of the interest in the ‘dependent’ row issue in X, times the control over the
‘independent’ column issue in C. Dependence of issues indicates to which extend
exchanges of control involving the ‘independent’ column issue are required to fur-
ther decision-making on the ‘dependent’ row issue. The main diagonal of matrix Diss
again gives the self-dependency, this time of the issues (Timmermans 2004). The
self-dependency of an issue indicates to which extend decision making on this issue
involves other issues. It follows logically that the most self-dependent issue is also
the most independent issue in the social system and consequently offers the minimum
contribution in terms of potential exchange of control.
In line with the rationale developed above, a random procedure for the mutation
of an actor in the LSA is specified. In this procedure the interest and control of the
most self-dependent actor, k, for the most self-dependent issue, l (cell kl in C and
cell lk in X, see Table 2) are replaced by a random number in the range Cmini=k,j to
Cmaxi=k,j and Xminj=l,i to Xmaxj=l,k , while keeping total control of the mutated actor and
total interest in the mutated issue unchanged through normalizing the vectors to their
original lengths. This procedure both conserves the total power of the selected actor
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and total interest in the selected issue and avoids sudden changes in the distribution
of power and interest in the social system.
This concludes the theoretical development of a dynamic model of a social system
consisting of rational actors characterized by control over and interest in issues. The
dynamics are driven by a variation and selection procedure. The typical dynamics of
such a model in the absence of exchange is shown in the first 50.000 simulation steps
of Fig. 1. In this figure the simulation results of the Non-linear System of Action
(NLSA) are characterized using distance from equilibrium, indicating the amount of
exchange of control required to reach equilibrium from the current state of the model.
Distance from equilibrium, scφ , at iteration step s is calculated as:
scφ =
∑
ij
∣∣sc∗ij − scij
∣∣, (4)
where scij is the actual control of decision maker i over issue j , sc∗ij is the equilibrium
control of actor i over issue j and s is the number of the iteration step. See the
Appendix for a procedure to calculate the distribution of equilibrium control, sc∗ij .
In the first part of the simulation run the model moves away from equilibrium
because mutated actors adding to the potential for exchange of control are retained
in the social system. After this initial period, the model reaches a dynamic equilib-
rium, a state where new actors are not able to push the social system further out of
equilibrium and where unfavorable mutations cause the system to make minor moves
back to equilibrium. After 50.000 steps the mutation procedure is stopped and an ex-
change module is started causing the social system to fall back to equilibrium in the
next 50.000 steps. The exchange process randomly selects two actors and two issues
and implements the exchange when profitable to both actors.
The exchange procedure implemented in the simulation of Fig. 1 is a ran-
dom procedure. For the NLSA we need a procedure that simulates social develop-
ment through actual exchanges of control. Exchange of control in a real world so-
cial system requires two conditions to be fulfilled. First, exchange of control can
Fig. 1 Distance from equilibrium step 1–50.000 mutate only, step 50.000–100.000 exchange only, step
100.000–150.000 mutate and exchange
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only take place if a ‘double coincidence of wants’ exists between the actors in-
volved. The ‘double coincidence of wants’ means that an actor wants something
from another actor and that this other actor has something to offer in return. In
the (N)LSA, if actor i wants more control over issue j and less control over is-
sue k while actor l wants more control over issue k and less control over is-
sue i they can engage in a bilateral exchange of control over issue i for control
over issue j . Second, the exchange can only be implements if a solution, alterna-
tive or decision exists in practice that mobilizes the exchange (Timmermans 2004;
Crozier and Friedberg 1980).
For example, if a potential for exchange of control exists between agricultural
landowners and a water authority regarding the use of their land for controlled flood-
ing, this exchange cannot be implemented without infrastructure that keeps the flood-
ing controlled and the farm buildings save and accessible. If this infrastructure is not
feasible, the exchange cannot be implemented. Both the identification of profitable
exchanges of control, establishing the value of control over the different issues and
the development of feasible solution are interactive processes, in which interdepen-
dent actors engage in negotiations in order to realize their interests by creating col-
lective goods (Timmermans 2004; Coleman 1990; Crozier and Friedberg 1980).
We now develop the exchange module along the following line of thinking. First,
we suppose that actors primarily engage in negotiation concerning exchanges of con-
trol with actors on which they depend in reaching their goals and that the identifica-
tion of potential exchanges of control, including the setting of the prices for control
over specific issues, mostly result from these type of negotiations. Second we assume
that concrete alternatives that allow for the implementation of these exchanges of
control mostly result from interaction on inter-dependent issues. This means that we
can again use the matrices Dact and Diss to select the two most dependent actors and
two most dependent issues and implement the exchange of control accordingly. For
the value of control over the different issues equilibrium prices are used, calculated
in accordance with the procedure described in the Appendix. The third part of Fig. 1,
step 100.000 to 150.000 shows the typical dynamics of the NLSA. Again first the
model is pushed away from equilibrium. In this phase, the potential for exchange of
control added by mutated actors outperforms the pressure to move back to equilib-
rium caused by the exchanges implemented. After some time these two processes
reach a dynamic equilibrium, a poised state where the model is kept at a certain dis-
tance from equilibrium. In the next section we present some simulation results of the
model in relation to the specific dynamics of transitions.
4 Transition characteristics of the non-linear system of action
The NLSA described above is developed to model transitional behavior of social
systems. In order to do so, simulation results should show dynamic behavior typical
for the punctuated equilibrium paradigm. In this section we evaluate the dynamics
of the NLSA model regarding two characteristics pertinent to societal transitions.
First we look at the occurrence of power law distributions in the simulation record of
exchanges of control and address the related punctuated equilibrium behavior. Sec-
ond we look into structural change or transitions. For the analysis we use results
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from model simulations for different sizes of the NLSA. All simulations are made
using randomly generated LSA’s with 2 up to 45 actors and issues. The matrices C
and X are generated by random permutation of vectors of the appropriate size and
normalizing the resulting matrices column wise. This procedure resembles the ability
of human actors to derive their preferences up to a strong preference order through
paired comparisons (Beroggi 1999, 2000). All simulations concerning the occurrence
of power law distributions are continued for 250.000 steps after a burn in period of
also 250.000 steps. The results used to analyze structural change are drawn from a
randomly created NLSA of 17 actors and 29 issues. These runs are continued for
100.000 steps after a burn in period of 50.000 steps.
4.1 Power law distribution and punctuated equilibrium
Rotmans, Kemp and Van der Brugge state that transitions show episodic develop-
ment (Rotmans 2005; Rotmans et al. 2001; Van der Brugge et al. 2005; Kemp et
al. 1998). Similar accounts of social development as an alternation of long periods
of stability and short periods of change can be found in the agenda setting litera-
ture (Kingdon 1984; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Baumgarter and Jones 1993),
the literature on population dynamics and economic development (Davis 1945;
Schumpeter 1934), psychology, group dynamics, organization science, biology and
self-organizing systems (Gersick 1991) and evolutionary theory (Gould and Eldredge
1977; Eldredge and Gould 1972). In a theoretical analysis of this episodic behavior,
Bak and Sneppen relate punctuated equilibrium behavior to self organized criticality
(SOC) and scale-free behavior as signified by a power law distribution of the output
of a critical system (Bak and Sneppen 1993).
The concept of power laws is related to the idea that small events happen all the
time and big events happen less frequently. In the NLSA the relevant event is the
exchange of control. According to Coleman exchange of control is the driving force
and measure of social development (Coleman 1990). Big and frequent exchanges of
control signify periods of fast social development like societal transitions while peri-
ods of rare and small exchanges or the absence of exchanges of control characterize
periods of slow development and stagnation.
To investigate the frequency distribution of the exchanges of control in the NLSA,
a total of 61 simulations with randomly generated NLSA of different sizes where
run. The size of the NLSA models in term of actors and issues where chosen to
cover the range of 2 to 45 actors and 2 to 45 issues, while combining both small
numbers of actors with large number of issues as large number of actors with small
number of issues. For the analysis the models are characterized by their size, where
size equals the number of actor’s times the number of issues. For all models frequency
distributions of the magnitude of the exchanges of control observed in the simulations
are drawn up. A typical frequency distribution is presented in Fig. 2, both as bar graph
and on a log-log plot. The goodness of fit of the straight line in Fig. 2b is indicative for
the conformity of the frequency distribution of exchanges of control to a power law.
The slope of the line on the log-log plot equals the exponent b of the power function,
axb , fitted through these points, while the adjusted R-square reflects the goodness of
fit. In the subsequent section adjusted R-squares are used to evaluate the dynamics of
the NLSA.
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 2 Characteristic frequency distribution of exchanges of control. (a) Bar graph, (b) Log-log plot
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To evaluate the occurrence of power laws in the frequency distribution of the ex-
changes of control for a wide range of models, a power function is fitted through
all 61 distributions obtained in the simulations. In Fig. 3a the adjusted R-squares
of the fitted power functions are plotted on the vertical axis against the size of the
NLSA on the horizontal axis. From Fig. 3a it appears that if the size of the NLSA
exceeds 99, the adjusted R-squares exceed 0.94, identifying a good fit of the power
function. These data proof the occurrence of power law distributions in the frequency
distributions of the exchanges of control in NLSA simulations for models with a size
exceeding 99.
In Fig. 3b, the exponents of the power function obtained are plotted against the
size of the respective models. Here a reasonable relation between size and exponent
of the power function appears. For models of limited size the exponent approaches
zero. The power function than reduces to a line with a constant value, which means
that for small NLSA the exchanges are distributed around some average value. For
NLSA with a bigger size the exponents obtain values of −1.5 to −2.0, which is in
the same order as Bak and Sneppen obtained in their simple model of evolution (Bak
and Sneppen 1993).
For punctuated equilibrium dynamics, besides the power law distribution of the
magnitude of the model output, the distance in time between exchange events is of
interest (Jensen 1998). We expect a power law distribution of these distances in steps.
Figure 4 shows the results of this analysis for the same simulation used for Fig. 3.
Figure 4a presents the adjusted R-squares for a power law fitted through the distance
between events for model sizes ranging from 4 to 2025. The results are similar to
the results of Fig. 3a. Adjusted R-squares, however, are somewhat lower and the two
lines intersect at adjusted R-squares of 0.84 and a size of 87. The exponents of the
power law range from −0.5 to −1.2 and are smaller than the coefficients found in
Fig. 3b.
The analyses above proves that NLSA with a size, number of actors times number
of issues, exceeding 100, self-organize into a critical state and show punctuated equi-
librium dynamics in which periods of limited exchange of control and periods of high
exchange of control alternate with periods without exchange. Rotmans et al. connect
this alternation of periods of slow and fast social development with the concept of
social transitions (Rotmans 2005; Rotmans et al. 2001; Van der Brugge et al. 2005;
Kemp et al. 1998). Although Rotmans et al. do not explicitly use the terminology of
Bak and Sneppen, Gould and Eldredge and Gersick, their description of transitions
and references to the literature on complex adaptive systems mirrors the theories de-
veloped by these authors.
Next we look into the dynamics of the NLSA in more detail and investigate the
punctuated-equilibrium dynamics directly. We compare a small NLSA of 3 actors
and 3 issues and thus a size of 9 and a bigger NLSA of 17 actors and 29 issues and a
size 493. The second model lies well into the areas of Figs. 3a and 4a where power
law distribution of the NLSA output occurs and punctuated equilibrium dynamics can
be expected. In the smaller model, according to Fig. 3a, a distribution of exchanges
of control around an average is expected while long periods of quiescence will be
absent.
The output for the smaller and bigger NLSA is plotted in Figs. 5a and 5b respec-
tively together with the cumulative exchange of control for the entire simulation pe-
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 3 Power law distribution of the frequency distribution of exchanges. (a) Goodness of fit to the power
function f (x) = axb . (b) Exponents b of the power function f (x) = axb
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 4 Power law distribution of the distance between exchanges. (a) Goodness of fit to the power function
f (x) = axb . (b) Exponents b of the power function f (x) = axb
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riod. For the small model no punctuated equilibrium behavior is present in the record
and exchanges of control are distributed around an average. As a result the speed
of social development reflected by cumulative exchange is constant and cumulative
exchange grows in a straight line. In Fig. 5b, the big NLSA, punctuated equilibrium
behavior shows up clearly in the record of exchanges of control and an alternation
of slow or no social change and fast social change is observed in the development
of cumulative exchange represented by the dotted line. The scales of the two plots
cannot be compared as the numerical values are related to the size of the model.
4.2 Structural change or transition
A second concept central to societal transition is structural change (Rotmans 2005;
Rotmans et al. 2001; Van der Brugge et al. 2005; Kemp et al. 1998). In the body
of literature on societal transitions, this structural change is cast in terms of large
scale technological, economical, ecological, socio-cultural and institutional change
(Rotmans et al. 2001) in which a dominant structure or design of a social system, the
regime, is replaced by a social system with a different structure and design, the niche
(Rotmans et al. 2001; Geels and Kemp 2000). This dominant structure or design is
similar to what Gersick describes as deep structure (Gersick 1991).
In transition theory the regime is both characterized by a ‘dominant’ set of ac-
tors and a ‘dominant’ set of substantive characteristics, like institutions, practices,
structures and artifacts or infrastructures (Rotmans 2005; Van der Brugge et al. 2005;
Kemp et al. 1998). At an abstract level, these regime characteristics translate into
a distribution of power of actors and value of issues in the NLSA. Power of actors
is a straightforward concept, both from definition of regimes in transition theory as
from the NLSA. The translation of the substantive characteristics of the regime into
values of issues is however less clear-cut and will be explained below. In the NLSA
all issues obtain a value based on the interest of actors in the respective issues. If
we characterize the substantive elements of a regime with issues and rate the level
up to which these issues are served by the current regime with the values, the NLSA
gives us a quantitative characterization of the issues by the regime. For example, if
in the case of decision-making on the construction of a power-plant profitability is
one of the issues, a high value for control over profitability indicates that the current
regime highly values this issue when taking decisions, while in a similar case where
actors representing environmental concerns are member of the regime, issue of sus-
tainability will have a higher value. For a method to define these issues for a real
world social system we refer to Timmermans, Schouten et al. and Timmermans and
Beroggi (Timmermans 2004; Schouten et al. 2001; Timmermans and Beroggi 2000).
Structural change can thus be described in terms of a significant change in the
power structure and/or value structure of the NLSA. The distribution of power and
values are both system level entities and are expressed in the power vector, r , and
the value vector, v of the LSA. These vectors give the power of each actor i and the
value of each issue j and are vectors of length m and n respectively. Both vectors
can be derived directly from the matrices C and X (see Appendix). For the analysis
in this article we define a structural change of the power and/or value structure as a
persistent change in the most powerful actor and the most valued issue. Persistence is
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 5 Punctuated equilibrium dynamics in the NLSA. (a) NLSA with 3 actors and 3 issues (small).
(b) NLSA with 17 actors and 29 issues (big)
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determined by a threshold in steps. We identify this structural change with a transition
or regime change as defined by Rotmans et al. (Rotmans 2005; Van der Brugge et al.
2005; Geels and Kemp 2000; Kemp et al. 1998).
In Fig. 6 the occurrences of structural change in the power structure and the value
structure of the NLSA with a threshold of 500 steps are presented. Each time the
power or value structure changes and remains in place for at least 500 steps, a vertical
line marking structural change, regime change or transition is plotted. The figure uses
the same simulation as used in Fig. 5b. In case a threshold smaller than 500 is used, far
more regime changes occur, however, long periods of stable regimes remain. Most of
the regime changes seem to occur in the vicinity of periods of rapid change. Unstable
periods where change and stagnation alternate often show a few regime changes in
a limited period. These are the periods of transition, where a ‘struggle’ takes place
between the actors to take over the regime. Only after some time a new stable regime
emerges.
To confirm the relation between exchange events and regime changes in both
terms of power and values, the empirical distribution functions of the distance in
steps from a transition in the power regime to an exchange event f (tranP) and
the distance in steps from a transition in the value regime to an exchange event
f (tranV ), the empirical distribution of the distance for any step to a change in power
regime f (stepP) and the distance for any step to a change in the value regime
f (stepV ) are derived and compared using a single tailed two-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test. The distributions are derived and tested both for the backward dis-
tance and the forward distance between regime changes and exchange events
[f (tranP back), f (tranP forward), f (tranV back), f (tranV for)] and backward and forward
distance for all steps [f (stepP back), f (stepP forward), f (stepV back),V stepV forward)].
The null hypothesis for the single tailed test is that respectively f (tranP back),
f (tranP forward), f (tranV back) and f (tranV forward) have the same continuous distrib-
ution as respectively f (stepP back), f (stepP forward), f (stepV back) and f (stepV forward),
while the alternative hypothesis is that the dataset labeled ‘tran’ are smaller than
datasets labeled ‘step’, indicating that regime changes occur significantly closer
to exchange events. At the 0.05 significance level, only the alternative hypotheses
for f (tranP back) is accepted (α = 0.024), indicating that transitions in the power
regime normally occur close after an exchange event. The alternative hypothe-
sis for, f (tranP forward) is not accepted (α = 0.069). The alternative hypothesis for
f (tranV back) (α = 0.206) and f (tranV forward) (α = 0.649) are both rejected. We con-
clude that changes in the distribution of power in the NLSA normally happen close
after an exchange event, while also quit often exchanges occur after a change in power
structure. No relation exists between changes in the value structure of the NLSA and
exchange events.
From the characteristics of the NLSA, punctuated equilibrium dynamics, power
law distribution for both magnitude of exchanges of control and distance in time
steps between exchanges of control, alternation of periods of stagnation and periods
of accelerated change, structural changes in the distribution of power over the actor
and value over the issues, combined with a strong relation between exchange events
and changes in the power distribution, we conclude that the NLSA performs well in
modeling the specific characteristics of societal transitions as hypothesized by tran-
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 6 Structural Changes in the NLSA. (a) Structural change in the distribution of power. (b) Structural
change in the distribution of values
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sition theory. At the same time the model has a potentially strong connection with
practice and is well embedded in sociological theory.
5 Possible application and further research
The NLSA can be used to study societal change and social transitions in different
modes. First, the model can be used as a simulation tool generating its own social
development, characterized by the speed of development, the direction of the devel-
opment in terms of the issues, occurrence of changes in the distribution of power of
actors or values of issues. In this case the model operates internally without a con-
nection to an outside world or is treated as a model of an entire society. The results
and insight gained from this type of studies primarily help us to better understand the
dynamics of a social system and increase our insight in the conditions under which
transitions occur. In the previous section some results of this type of research were
presented in relation to the occurrences of transitions.
In this more theoretical analytic realm also the analysis of network characteristics
generated by the NLSA is of interest. This type of analyses would include the analy-
sis of network characteristics from social network analysis like centrality, density and
cores and cliques (Scott 2000) in relation to speed and direction of change and tran-
sitions. This type of research promises to yield relevant observations for transition
management, as findings on network characteristics can be translated to the manage-
ment of real world social networks. Transition management then takes the shape of
network management, with the aim to develop network structures that are positively
related to radical change.
Some authors have related empirical data on social networks to scale free net-
works showing power law distribution of their degree (Whitmeyer and Yeingst 2006).
Others have found power law distributions of network components and claim that
these networks are self-organized (Bak 1996; Dorogovtsev et al. 2003; Jensen 1998)
resulting in globally stable and locally instable social networks (Whitmeyer and
Yeingst 2006). Whitmeyer and Yeingst also hypothesize that self-organized crit-
ical networks are robust and resilient and therefore difficult to change. At this
point in time the relation between evolving networks and network topology (Watts
2002; Albert and Barabási 2002) and societal transitions are unclear. These rela-
tions however are interesting and their possible consequences for the field of soci-
etal transitions and transition management possibly far reaching. The NLSA offers
the opportunity to connect social development and the evolution of network topol-
ogy.
In a second mode the NLSA can be used to simulate the reaction of the social sys-
tem studied to outside developments. A good example of this type of application is the
analysis of the influence of technological development on the direction and speed of
social change. Technological development is often seen as a driving force for both the
direction and speed of social development. Often the term technology push is coined
in this realm. In the NLSA technology push can be implemented by setting a bias on
the exchange module of the model, such that exchanges involving a specific issue are
selected more often than other exchanges. This will possibly have consequences for
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both the speed and direction of these developments and possibly the occurrence of
transitions. Although the hypotheses formulated above seem logical, its further analy-
sis using the NLSA is not trivial. Because the dynamics of the NLSA resulting from
the bias on the exchange module feeds back into the selection and mutation procedure
for actors the simulation output is not easy to predict and probably sensitive to initial
conditions and random disturbances. For example, if sustainable development is one
of the issues included in the NLSA, the development of more sustainable alternatives
to cars driven by fossil fuel, for example hydrogen cars, can result in an increase of
the exchanges related to sustainable development. Based on our insight in the NLSA
we conjecture that technological development will indeed direct social development
in a specific direction and increase the speed of development in that direction. This
hypothesis is based on the direct influence of technological development, in term of
exchanges of control, in the NLSA. If a specific issue is more often involved in the
exchanges of control, this is expected to have a direct effect on the total exchange
of control related to the issue addressed by this new technology. It is however still a
hypothesis because the influence of the feedback through selection and mutation of
actors is difficult to grasp.
Changes in the preferences of actors are another example of a social development
or trend that can influence the development of a specific social system. Again sus-
tainable development is an interesting example. The question than is: Will the current
surge in interest in sustainable development related to climate change, result in a more
sustainable development? In the NLSA such a development should be signified by an
increase in exchange of control related to the issue of sustainable development. Such
a trend in the development of preferences can be simulated in the LSA by imple-
menting a gradual increase in the interest in the issue of sustainable development. We
hypothesize that changes in preference do not influence social development in a pre-
determined direction and will also not speed up the development of the social system
in this more and more preferred direction. Firstly, because the increase in the interests
is evenly distributed over all the actors, the possibilities for a ‘double coincidence of
wants’ decreases because all actors basically become more and more interested in
control over the same issue. Secondly, a trend in a specific preference does not in-
fluence the selection of exchanges of control in any predetermined direction. Again
this hypothesis seems logical but is not trivial because of feedback mechanisms and
possible sensitivity to initial conditions and random events.
Further use of the model can also focus on instruments of transition management
(Loorbach 2007; Rotmans 2005). Important instruments of transition management
are visioning (Rotmans 2005; Van der Brugge et al. 2005) and strategic niche man-
agement (Kemp et al. 1998). In transition management, visioning aims to adaptively
develop shared problem perceptions and long term visions and goals to guide short
term action (Loorbach 2007). For the NLSA this implies the convergence of inter-
ests of actors on the values adopted in the vision. Transition management hypothesis
that such a convergence can result in a structural change, a transition, of the societal
system considered. With the NLSA, such an instrument can be evaluated by imple-
menting a convergence of the interest of actors on specific issues and analyzing the
relation with both the speed and direction of social development and the occurrence
of persistent change in the power and value structure of the NLSA.
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Strategic niche management aims to develop innovative alternative solutions for
wicked problems in niches initially protected from the scrutiny of the market (Kemp
et al. 1998). In the NLSA, alternatives are the carriers of exchange of control. The ef-
fect of more or less innovative condition on the exchange of control can be evaluated
in the NLSA by increasing the opportunities for exchange of control and evaluate the
resulting speed and direction of social development and the occurrence of structural
change. It is especially interesting to see if a burst of innovations can eliminate a sta-
ble regime and push the societal system into transition resulting in a persistent change
of its power and/or value structure.
A third promising application of the NLSA would be the co-evolutionary devel-
opment of two or more social systems. This would require the development of cou-
pled NLSA’s. The coupling can be implemented in a number of ways. First actors
can be exchanged between the NLSA’s based on their self-dependence; second ex-
changes of control can be implemented in one of the systems only based on the mag-
nitude of the exchange realized. And third, newly mutated actors can be incorporated
in one of the systems based on their contribution to the potential for exchange of
control in the respective NLSA’s. This type of models could facilitate the simula-
tion of synchronic development in two or more societal systems and operationalize
the concept of co-evolutionary steering (Rotmans 2005; Kemp and Rotmans 2005;
Rotmans et al. 2001). Furthermore the model can be used to evaluate more oper-
ational instruments of transition management, like the transition arena (Loorbach
2007).
6 Conclusions
Transitions are structural innovations of societal systems, transformations between
two temporal (dynamic) equilibrium states. In between there is a period of rapid
change during which the system undergoes irreversible re-organization (Rotmans
2005). The conceptualization of societal transitions in transition studies has much
in common with a class of revolutionary change theories based on the punctuated
equilibrium paradigm postulated by Eldtredge and Gould (Gould and Eldredge 1977;
Eldredge and Gould 1972). In an overview article, Gersick confronts the Darwinian
concept of incremental cumulative change with the punctuated equilibrium paradigm
by comparing a range of theories on change from the social sciences (Gersick 1991).
We started this paper by positioning transition science in this realm of revolutionary
change theories.
In developing our computational approach to societal transitions, we focused on
both the punctuated equilibrium dynamics of the output of such a model and the
identification of structural change in terms of deep structure (Gersick 1991) and self
organized criticality (Bak and Sneppen 1993). Our starting point is the Linear System
of Action (Coleman 1990). In this paper a Non-linear System of Action (NLSA) is
developed. The model is an extension of the Linear System of Action (LSA). While
the LSA is an equilibrium model, the NLSA, through the addition of a variation and
selection algorithm, is dynamic. The extension of the LSA is developed and motivated
in line with the rational actor model underpinning the LSA. Furthermore the variation
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and selection procedure follows the finding by Bak and Sneppen, that in order to
produce self organized critical behavior, the least fit actors should be selected for
mutation (Bak and Sneppen 1993). In the NLSA, social development is reflected in
the exchange of control.
The NLSA produces simulation results that mirror some of the main character-
istics of transitions in a societal system. Both the frequency distribution of the ex-
changes of control and the length of the periods between two successive exchanges
of control follow a power law distribution. These results prove that NLSA models
with a size, number of actors times number of issues, exceeding 100, self-organize
into a critical state. In this self-organized critical sate the NLSA shows punctuated
equilibrium dynamics in which periods of limited exchange of control and stag-
nation and periods of high exchange of control, transitions, alternate. In this way
the NLSA establishes a more formal relation between the metaphoric use of con-
cepts from complex adaptive systems theory in transition theory (Rotmans 2005;
Van der Brugge et al. 2005; Kemp et al. 1998), literature on policy development
and agenda setting (Baumgarter and Jones 1993) and Kingdon (1984) and theories of
self-organized criticality (Bak and Sneppen 1993; Bak et al. 1988).
In the NLSA, structural change is connected to a persistent change in its power
or value structure. For transition science, especially the emergence of new power and
value regimes in the NLSA is of interest. Our results show that persistent changes
in the power structure of the NLSA occur and normally result from periods with
relatively high exchange of control and are often followed by periods with exchange
of control. No relation has been found between the emergence of new value regimes
and the occurrences of exchanges of control.
The NLSA can be used to study societal change and social transitions in differ-
ent modes. First, the model can be used as a simulation tool generating its own so-
cial development, characterized by the speed of development, the direction of the
development and the emergence of new power or value regimes. In this realm also
research on the dynamics of network structures and the evolution of network topol-
ogy in the NLSA and the possible development of scale free networks and power
law distributions of network components (Whitmeyer and Yeingst 2006; Albert and
Barabási 2002) and self-organized networks (Bak 1996; Dorogovtsev et al. 2003;
Jensen 1998) resulting in globally stable and locally instable social networks (Whit-
meyer and Yeingst 2006; Watts 2002). Although these analyses are theoretical and
their relation with societal transitions and transition management are still unclear,
their empirical consequences and connectedness to real social networks seem promis-
ing. The results and insight gained from this type of studies primarily help us to better
understand the dynamics of social systems and increase our insight in the conditions
under which transitions are imminent.
In a second mode the model can be used to simulate the reaction of the social
system studied to outside developments. Good examples of this type of application
are the analysis of the influence of technological development and changes in the
preferences of actors on the direction and speed of social change. In this mode the
consequences of the current surge in interest in sustainable development for social
change can be analyzed. Further use of the model can also focus on instruments
of transition management like visioning (Loorbach 2007; Rotmans 2005; Van der
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Brugge et al. 2005) and strategic niche management (Kemp et al. 1998). Both can be
implemented and studied with the NLSA.
In summary we conclude that the NLSA mirrors some important characteristics of
societal transitions, is promising for its purpose of gaining insight in the dynamics of
transitions and the evaluation and development of instruments and tools for transition
management. Besides the model is flexible, allows for a connection to real world
issues and is well embedded in sociological theory.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
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Appendix: The LSA and the calculation of equilibrium control
In the LSA, there are two sets of elements, one referring to the decision makers i
(i = 1, . . . , n) and the other to the issues j (j = 1, . . . ,m). Decision maker i has
control cij over issue j and interest xji in issue j . Decision makers maximize utilities
in accordance with a Cobb-Douglas-type utility function:
Ui = cx1ii1 cx2ii2 . . . cxmiim ,
where Ui is the total utility of decision maker i, cij is the amount of control over
issue j held by decision maker i and xji expresses the contribution of this amount of
control over issue j to Ui . In the Cobb Douglas-type utility function, we have:
n∑
j=1
xji = 1 and all xji ≥ 0.
Let C be the matrix of control, with entries cij and let X be the matrix of interest
with xji . Both X and C are scaled arbitrarily and are normalized so that:
m∑
i=1
cij = 1 and
n∑
j=1
xji = 1 and xji ≥ 0 and cij ≥ 0.
The matrix of equilibrium control C∗, where the entry c∗ij , stands for the equilibrium
control of decision maker i over issue j , can be calculated as C∗ = DrX′Dv−1. The
matrix Dr is a diagonal matrix with elements ri and the matrix Dv is a diagonal
matrix with elements vj .
The power vector r , with elements ri , and the value vector v, with elements vj ,
can be calculated as
r = (I − CX + En)−1en1 and v = (I − XC + Em)−1em1,
where En is a square matrix with elements 1/n, Em is a square matrix with elements
1/m and the vectors en1 and em1 are defined as n× 1 and m× 1 columns from these
matrices; I is the identity matrix.
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